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During the mid- to late-twentieth century, Pierre Bourdieu crated a 
conceptual framework that describes how underclass status becomes 
embodied in individuals, and the ways that personal, professional, 
and	political	fields	perpetuate	this	oppression.	Bourdieu’s	theories	also	
outline	 the	 role	 of	 the	 “critical	 intellectual”	 in	undermining	 oppres-
sion	and	fighting	for	social	justice.	Using	key	terms	from	Bourdieu’s	
explanatory framework, this article examines the power relations and 
symbolic violence built into the interactions between social workers 
and	clients,	and	offers	suggestions	as	to	how	reflexive	and	relational	so-
cial work can help workers reduce this impact. This paper also explores 
the role of social workers in addressing social inequalities by examining 
Bourdieu’s writings in terms of macro approaches to disparity.
Key	words:	Bourdieu,	habitus,	power,	reflexivity,	social	work,	symbolic	
violence
Pierre Bourdieu’s Theoretical Contribution
Field and Capital
 According to Pierre Bourdieu, the arenas, networks, and so-
cial spaces where individuals live define their social lives (Ea-
gleton & Bourdieu, 1992; Waquant, 2008). Otherwise known as 
fields,	Bourdieu described these social spaces in language sim-
ilar to that of a war or game, with “battlegrounds,” “stakes,” 
“rules of the game,” “power relations,” “common interests,” and 
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“trump cards” (Bourdieu, 1990; Bourdieu & Waquant, 1992; Ea-
gleton & Bourdieu, 1992). In addition, fields have recognizable 
boundaries—for example, the professional (various professions), 
personal (families, social networks, residence), and political (ad-
ministrative institutions, political agencies). Some of the more 
common fields found in Bourdieu’s work include the cultural, 
economic, intellectual, bureaucratic, and power fields. In addi-
tion, fields also include sub-fields. For example, the intellectual 
field may include the sub-fields of arts and social sciences; or 
in the case of the bureaucratic field, sub-fields may include the 
welfare and penal “arms” of the state (Waquant, 2010). 
 The “stakes” “power relations” and “common interests” in-
herent within fields revolve around Bourdieu’s notion of capi-
tal. As described by Bourdieu, capital is any resource in a social 
arena that enables an individual to benefit from participation 
(Bourdieu, 1979/1980, 1986; Waquant, 2008). Capital comes in 
three major forms: economic (material and financial assets), cul-
tural (education, accent, clothing, behavior, and objects such as 
books and art), and social (networks with well-placed individ-
uals) (Bourdieu, 1979/1980, 1986, 1989). As defined by Bourdieu 
(1992), symbolic capital is best understood as a trait of favorabil-
ity, held by of any of the three primary forms when they are 
recognized by the majority or by individuals in power as le-
gitimate. Bourdieu’s theory also contends that there is always 
competition for capital because it can only have value when it is 
scarce and unevenly distributed. Thus, competition is an essen-
tial component of capital, and exists within fields and between 
them—individuals are in a constant struggle to assert particular 
forms of capital, gain access to and control them, and to devalue 
other forms of capital (Bourdieu & Waquant, 1992).
Habitus, Embodiment, and Doxa
 With his concept of habitus, Bourdieu developed an anal-
ysis describing the interplay between society, status, and the 
body (Ignatow, 2009). According to Bourdieu’s theory, an in-
dividual’s habitus is comprised of the unconscious schemata, 
acquired through perpetual exposure to social conditioning, 
through which we perceive, judge, and act in the world (Bour-
dieu, 1972/1977; Waquant, 2008). Schemata, a term developed by 
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Jean Piaget in the mid-1920s, describes the structures by which 
individuals’ thoughts are organized. According to Piaget’s the-
ory (2006), through the use of schemata, most new situations do 
not require conscious processing. Instead, people organize new 
experiences within their mind’s organizational structure. Simi-
larly, Bourdieu’s definition of habitus represents an instinctual 
understanding of new events based on previous experience. 
 Bourdieu describes the embodiment of these understand-
ings insofar as an individual’s response to the world may be 
physical as well as mental. Individuals do not simply believe 
or think within certain structural boundaries—they “feel” 
confined by them, and are incapable of thinking outside them 
(Bourdieu, 1972/1977). As the common point of contact between 
past influences and present experiences, habitus is at once 
structured—by the social forces that produced it—and structur-
ing: it gives form and coherence to new experiences (Bourdieu, 
1972/1977, 1989; Waquant, 2008). Bourdieu also theorized that 
while the habitus is capable of adapting to new stimuli, it is also 
extremely stable, with a fixed tendency to act within preexisting 
limits and toward specific responses (Grenfell, 2004). 
 According to Waquant (2008), by formulating the concepts 
of field, capital, and habitus, Bourdieu was able to redefine in so-
ciological terms the notion of doxa. Originally conceptualized 
by Edmund Husserl, doxa involves a practical sense of what 
does or does not constitute a real possibility in the world (Lane, 
2000; Myles, 2004). According to Bourdieu’s (1972/1977) theory, 
there is a natural fit between individuals’ habitus and the fields 
in which they exist. As a result of this reciprocal fit, individu-
als develop a “common sense” of what is doable and thinkable 
(or unthinkable) within society, and perceive these as being 
self-evident and natural. This “common sense” is defined as the 
orthodoxy or doxa of the field. Anything outside of a particular 
way of acting is unorthodox, a challenge to the status quo, and 
is assumed to be forbidden, even when the status quo is oppres-
sive or detrimental to the individual (Waquant, 2008). Hence, 
without even being aware of it, individuals develop an assumed 
knowledge about the “the established cosmological and polit-
ical order [which] is perceived not as arbitrary, that is, as one 
possible order among others, but as a self-evident and natural 
order” (Everett, 2002, p. 66). 
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Symbolic Violence
 Following from the conceptualization of doxa is the idea of 
symbolic violence, which exists when doxa produces or sustains 
an unequal distribution of capital (Everett, 2002). By adopting 
the status quo as obvious and appropriate, even when it is hurt-
ful to them, individuals position themselves within the struc-
ture of society, further legitimizing and solidifying it (Bourdieu 
& Waquant, 1992; Eagleton & Bourdieu, 1992; Waquant, 2008). 
Furthermore, having accepted as legitimate the established (in-
equitable) social order and their position within it, individuals 
who are powerless and dominated believe the doxa which attri-
butes blame to themselves for their subordinate position (Bour-
gois, 2001; Bourgois & Schonberg, 2009). In effect, individuals 
within the underclass come to believe that they deserve their 
status. Thus, the “violence” within symbolic violence refers to 
the physical domination that is replaced or made purposeless 
because the individual sees the existing social order as natural 
and appropriate (Everett, 2002; Lane, 2000). According to Bour-
dieu, these actions upon the self make the domination under 
which they suffer more difficult than ever to challenge: 
 There are many things people accept without knowing. In 
fact, I think that in terms of symbolic domination, resistance is 
more difficult, since it is something you absorb like air, some-
thing you don’t feel pressured by; it is everywhere and nowhere, 
and to escape from that is very difficult … With the mechanism 
of symbolic violence, domination tends to take the form of a 
more effective, and in this sense more brutal, means of oppres-
sion. (Bourdieu, in Eagleton & Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 114–115)
Reflexivity 
 In an interesting departure from most theorists, Bourdieu 
included social scientists within the framework of his theories 
through a conceptualization of reflexivity. Bourdieu’s concept of 
reflexivity rests on the idea that it is impossible for the social 
scientist to be fully objective because he is an individual who 
exists within various fields in society, holds certain forms of 
capital, and whose habitus includes certain doxic notions (Bour-
dieu, 1980/1990; Bourdieu & Waquant, 1992). Thus, reflexivity 
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refers to the need for the social scientist to continually “turn 
the instruments of social science back” (Waquant, 2008, p. 273) 
upon him or herself in order to reduce distortions that may be 
introduced by the scientist’s personal experience: 
What distresses me when I read some works by sociologists 
is that people whose profession it is to objectivize the social 
world prove so rarely able to objectivize themselves, and fail 
so often to realize that what their apparently scientific dis-
course talks about is not the object, but their relation to the 
object. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 68–69)
 In line with his call for reflexivity, Bourdieu argued against 
intellectuals assuming the point of view of the “impartial spec-
tator” (Waquant, 2008). Instead, he suggested that by assuming 
such a point of view the social scientist is not only unaware of 
the influence of his own personal habitus and field, but also 
“(mis)construes the social world as an interpretive puzzle to 
be resolved, rather than a mesh of practical tasks to be accom-
plished in real time and space” (Waquant, 2008, p. 273). In such 
a way, Bourdieu argued that by portraying the world in purely 
objective terms (as “things” to be studied), the social scientist 
does not provide insight into the truth, but instead perpetuates 
delusions that already exist (habitus within individuals; doxa 
within fields). It is by this process that Bourdieu warned that in-
tellectuals become the “toys of social forces” who contribute to 
the maintenance of the status quo (Bourdieu, 1984/1988; Bour-
dieu & Waquant, 1992; Everett, 2002; Stabile & Morooka, 2003). 
 Bourdieu (1998/1998) argued that social scientists should 
guard against this possibility by remaining vigilant to their own 
biases, but also by aligning themselves with their subjects. Spe-
cifically, Bourdieu argued that social scientists should “devote 
some of their time and energy, in their activist mode,” to help 
“non-professionals to equip themselves with specific weapons 
of resistance” (1998/1998, p. 57). Within this idea is Bourdieu’s 
belief that intellectuals have a civic mission to “intervene in the 
public sphere on matters for which [they have] competency,” 
and to use the cultural, social, and intellectual capital that ac-
companies the position of the intellectual to expose the inequal-
ities inherent in society, and the methods by which they are 
perpetuated (Waquant, 2008, p. 275). 
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 Bourdieu believed that this mission was essential, and in 
Weight of the World (Bourdieu et al., 1993/2000), he organized the 
research of more than twenty sociologists to demonstrate how 
such a process could be conducted. Specifically, Bourdieu and 
his colleagues produced detailed ethnographies exploring in 
great depth the experiences of individual suffering throughout 
the world. In summarizing this process, Bourdieu explained 
that by speaking with and relating to their subjects, he and the 
other researchers were able to transcend the intellectual doxa 
that had previously defined their experience, illuminating the 
real social problems that contributed to their misery, and coun-
tering the symbolic violence built into their experiences. For 
scientists interested in uncovering the truth, Bourdieu believed 
that such a role was not only beneficial, but was necessary to 
conducting meaningful social science. 
Social Work’s Position Within the Bureaucratic Field
 Bourdieu’s contention that fields occur in hierarchies di-
rectly applies to the field of social work, particularly its history 
of fighting for status as a respected profession. Since Abraham 
Flexner (1915) stated that social work was a non-profession, the 
field has been preoccupied with its status, working continuous-
ly to demonstrate its legitimacy as a profession commensurate 
with medicine or law. According to Morris (2008), these efforts 
by social workers to prove the field’s status have resulted in 
some significant achievements, but have also come at a price. 
While social work has developed many of the attributes of pro-
fessionalization (e.g., a systematic body of knowledge, stan-
dardized curriculum, professional associations), some authors 
have argued that social work has left behind the tradition of 
social reform and replaced “its humanistic foundations with 
scientific positivism” (Morris, 2008, p. 30). According to Reid & 
Edwards (2006), social work has turned increasingly towards a 
model where services are no longer provided by social workers 
themselves, but are contracted through nonprofit and for-profit 
agencies. In a fervent critique, Reamer (1993) argues that due to 
professionalization, the field of social work attracts fewer peo-
ple drawn to a commitment to social justice and public welfare. 
This view is shared by Ferguson (2008), who argues that social 
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work’s turn toward professionalism, managerialism, and evi-
dence-based practice has resulted in a desertion of its original 
mission to promote social justice and to provide aid and com-
fort to the vulnerable, oppressed, and impoverished.
 In their article reviewing social work fields in ten countries, 
Weiss-Gal & Welbourne (2008) distinguish between two ap-
proaches for determining professionalization: the attributes (or 
trait) approach and the power (or control) approach. As outlined 
above, the successes that have been made in distinguishing 
American social work as a profession fall under the attributes 
approach. Despite these successes, a number of authors have 
argued that social work continues to fall short of professional 
status, particularly because it lacks the ability to make decisions 
on the basis of its own professional knowledge and values, free 
of the restraints of managers or agencies outside the profession 
(Hugman, 1996). In Bourdieusian terms, the field of social work 
lies under the control of the state, which itself is not a single 
monolithic entity, but a collection of sub-fields “vying over the 
definition and distribution of public goods” (Waquant, 2010, 
p. 200). Within this collective, social work represents the “left 
hand of the state”—the “feminine” “spendthrift,” in charge of 
“social functions” such as education, health, housing, welfare, 
and offering protection and relief to the poor. In contrast, the 
“right hand” or “masculine” side of the state is oriented toward 
economic discipline and law and order (Bourdieu, 1998/1998; 
Bourdieu & Waquant, 1993/1994).
 The significance of this conceptualization of social work is 
twofold. First, because the field is viewed as feminine-gendered, 
it is not on par with other sub-fields in terms of symbolic cap-
ital. In fact, some theorists (Hearn, 1982; Kadushin, 1976) have 
argued that it is because the field is characterized by the seem-
ingly natural and feminine qualities of listening and caring that 
it is considered by some to be a semi-profession. Added to these 
difficulties are doubts about social work’s knowledge base:
Although increasingly accepted as rigorous, the social scienc-
es continue to have a more ambiguous standing in political or 
popular consciousness compared to the natural science base 
of medicine, or the ancient traditions of the law. Social scien-
tists may find themselves caught between their work being 
accepted, and so seen as merely common sense (what people 
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knew anyway), and not being accepted because it challenges 
preconceptions. (Hugman, 1996, pp. 133–134)  
 Thus, as a sub-field vying for the resources of the state, so-
cial work has more to do to gain and maintain its legitimacy—it 
must fight for capital, and cling desperately to it. Furthermore, 
the sub-field is at pains to assert its “masculinity”—to prove (of-
ten through means-testing and other “tough-love” interventions) 
that it is a sensible and responsible trustee of the state’s resources.
 A second implication of Bourdieu’s understanding of social 
work is that within this framework, the field is not autonomous. 
According to Bourdieu (1980/1990, 1990), an autonomous field 
possesses its own history, operates according to its own habitus, 
and upholds a distinctive set of beliefs. As the mere inverse of the 
“right hand” of the state, social work does not have such sover-
eignty. As demonstrated in Wacquant’s (2010) description of the 
retrenchment of the welfare state and the correlated growth in 
the penal state over the last two decades, within this dichoto-
my, when one hand benefits, the other loses. Furthermore, as the 
feminine-associated “spendthrift” member of this duo, there is a 
doxic notion that social work should be placed under the guid-
ance of “disciplined” managers, distancing the field even further 
from self-determination in line with its values.
 The concept of autonomy is particularly salient within Bour-
dieu’s theory, since he believed it to be crucial for individuals to 
exercise critical analysis and debate on behalf of the underpriv-
ileged. Bourdieu believed that social scientists have a civic duty 
to invest their social and intellectual capital in political strug-
gles, and to apply critical reasoning to overthrow the doxa that 
defines the social conditions of the underclass and legitimizes 
their suffering. While in line with social work values, and ad-
vocated for directly in the NASW Code of Ethics (1999, Preamble 
section, para. 1), so long as the social work field remains pre-
occupied with its own legitimacy as a profession, and seeks to 
establish its validity by imitating the punitive and stingy meth-
ods of the bureaucratic field’s “right hand,” social work will be 
crippled in its ability to advocate for social justice and provide 
relief to the poor.
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Power and Symbolic Violence
 Bourdieu’s theoretical tools are also useful in highlighting 
the power relations and symbolic violence built into the inter-
actions between workers and clients. In a fitting application of 
Bourdieu’s theories to the practice of providing cash aid, Peillon 
(1998) describes the impact of means testing on the relationship 
between client and worker:
… officials police access to social benefits, ensuring that only 
those with a legitimate entitlement receive them. They oper-
ate in a field with political capital, and the exercise of their 
power immediately produces stigma, negative symbolic cap-
ital for their clients. (p. 223)
 Aiming to minimize this stigma and to recoup their posi-
tive symbolic capital, Peillon demonstrates that clients employ a 
number of strategies, from resistance to submission, inducing a 
response from workers charged with maintaining compliance. 
This relationship carries consequences for the habitus of both 
recipients and workers: clients identify themselves as “objects” 
of welfare, powerless and dependent; workers develop an ad-
ministrative habitus that is oriented towards power and con-
trol. The net effect is that:
[w]elfare agencies and welfare clients belong to a structure of 
domination, but one which is largely misrecognized. Bour-
dieu’s notion of ‘misrecognition’ simply indicates, in this con-
text, that the relationship between administrative agencies 
and welfare recipients, which is organized in terms of con-
trol, is misrecognized as caring. Misrecognition is of course 
not accidental: it activates symbolic structures which are in-
corporated in the habitus and are likely to ensure compliance. 
(Peillon, 1998, p. 221)
 Bourdieu (1979/1980) writes that the importance of sym-
bolic power is in its ability to impose the principles of reality 
construction on others. As trusted members of society who 
encounter individuals at their most vulnerable and define this 
experience through written assessments, it is incumbent upon 
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social workers to consider the effects of social inequalities on 
their clients’ habitus, the ways in which clients may have em-
bodied their dominated social position, the shame and blame 
of that subjected position, and the potential of their own ac-
tions in reinforcing symbolic violence (Bourgois, 2001; Bourgois 
& Schonberg, 2009). Approaches that attempt to improve client 
functioning though threats, punitive practices, and shaming 
may not only miss the mark, but may also do harm.
Reflexivity	and	Self-Scrutiny
 To adequately understand the impact of their involvement 
in the life-experiences of clients, and to guard against imped-
ing clients’ progress or adding to their suffering, social workers 
must evaluate the assumptions under which they operate. Ac-
cording to Houston (2002):
Social workers [must] analyze their taken for granted views 
… before they intervene in clients’ lives. Unless we reflect on 
our personal habitus and the professional field in which it is 
anchored, there is a danger of replicating biased notions that 
have been inculcated through professional training, manage-
rial directives or experiences in embattled social work agen-
cies. (p. 159)
 This awareness is gained through reflexivity,	or a process 
where social workers reflect on how the assumptions underly-
ing their practice have been mediated through their personal 
habitus and field as well as that of their profession (Bourdieu, 
1984/1988). To do this, social workers should reflect on the ways 
that their personal values, attitudes, and perceptions allow cer-
tain questions and ideas but exclude others. To the point, are 
workers trained to see individuals seeking help in terms of de-
ficiencies? Are they inclined to judge clients as drains upon so-
ciety rather than in terms of socio-economic failures? Finally, to 
what extent is lack of cooperation written off as evidence that 
they are undeserving, rather than an indication that the worker 
has not found a satisfactory fit between their analyses and the 
needs identified by clients (White, 1997)?
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 The importance of asking these questions lies in the fact 
that the information and analyses arrived at by social workers 
occurs through an interpretive process, with tremendous 
consequences for their clients (White, 1997). As part of their 
work, social workers make judgments and put together ar-
guments justifying their assessments. Importantly, however, 
“these judgments do not rely on formal knowledge alone, but on 
a range of other rationalities and warrants … judgments about 
blameworthiness and creditworthiness, responsibility and ir-
responsibility” (Taylor & White, 2001, p. 47). Thus, the assess-
ments and recommendations made by social workers are not 
simply the accumulation of objective knowledge, but a process 
of interpreting information: 
The process of engaging with others develops, recreates, chal-
lenges, negotiates, and affirms meaning. Therefore, the search 
for meaning requires reflexivity, a process of self-reference 
and examination. (Finn & Jacobson, 2003, p. 70) 
 In a critique of contemporary social work techniques, Finn 
& Jacobson (2003) point out that “systems,” “ecosystems,” and 
“person-in-environment” approaches offer little basis for crit-
ical engagement with questions of power. Based on the idea 
that social workers should help clients adapt to their current 
conditions, these approaches tend to naturalize arbitrary pow-
er differences and acquiesce to the dominant social, political, 
and economic order. In contrast, Finn and Jacobson (2003) ar-
gue, structurally-focused social workers start from the assump-
tion that the dominant political and economic order directly 
contributes to social problems, focusing all of their attention 
on the transformation of existing structures and ignoring the 
role of individuals. Both approaches have pitfalls: the systems 
and ecosystems approaches do not go far enough in addressing 
the power structures that cause client suffering, and structur-
alists overemphasize social inequalities while overlooking the 
capacity of individuals to achieve personal and social change 
(Finn & Jacobson, 2003). By engaging in a continual process of 
reflexivity and self-scrutiny, social workers can remain vigilant 
to the assumptions involved in their practice and balance the 
strengths and pitfalls of both methods.
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Relational Analysis 
 In The Weight of the World (1993/2000), Bourdieu and col-
leagues demonstrate the practice of relational analysis, a practice 
developed and employed by the authors where they interacted 
with subjects on a personal level over prolonged periods, and 
related to them as individuals who were experts about their 
own experiences. Describing the approach, Bourdieu identified 
five strategies for ensuring the truth and thoroughness of inter-
views: (1) making the project’s intentions, goals, and procedural 
principles explicit; (2) clarifying what subjects can and cannot 
say; (3) overcoming the limitations of documentation by taking 
into account body language, vocal stress, or irony; (4) making 
sure that interviewers had extensive knowledge of the social 
contexts of their subjects; and (5) ensuring through a process 
of self-reflexivity that interviewers objectified their social and 
professional contexts, and tried to distance themselves, as far 
as possible, from preconceived notions and values taken from 
their habitus and field (Schirato & Webb, 2003).
 Having described an engagement process that employs 
many of the strategies utilized in standard social work prac-
tice, why did Bourdieu distinguish the sociologists at work in 
Weight of the World from social workers, whom he characterized 
as “agents of the state”? Bourdieu believed that in order to pro-
vide true critical analysis of social conditions and to arrive at 
“truth,” it was essential for the “critical intellectual” to remain 
autonomous from social conditions that could influence his as-
sessment (Bourdieu, 1980/1990, 1990). Although Bourdieu be-
lieved that there were a number of problems with the field of 
sociology during his time (Garrett, 2007a), he also believed that 
sociologists were particularly capable of this task:
One does not enter sociology without severing all the ad-
herences and adhesions by which one is ordinarily bound to 
groups, without abjuring the beliefs constitutive of member-
ship and without renouncing all ties of filiation or affiliation. 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 178)
 Furthermore, as argued earlier, Bourdieu harbored many 
doubts about the ability of social workers to remain autonomous 
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and to practice within the context of their own professional val-
ues, especially given the broader context of their position with-
in the bureaucratic field. 
 Evident in Bourdieu’s relational analysis is the idea that 
social workers must be skeptical of the assumed dichotomy 
between a worker’s professional and personal self. In the field 
of social work, professional objectivity is highly valued as a 
quality that allows workers to divorce themselves from subjec-
tive feelings, attitudes, and beliefs that might negatively influ-
ence practice. Rather than attempting to develop a synthesis in 
which professionals make use of their personal selves in im-
plementing professional functions (Shulman, 1991), workers are 
encouraged to remain autonomous from the clients they serve. 
Shulman (1991) suggests that such a separation is not only im-
possible, but that it undermines an essential component of the 
helping process—the interpersonal relationship between the 
worker and the client:
In addition to being complex, social work practice is also a 
dynamic and interactional process in which the variables 
that contribute to the outcomes affect and are affected by 
each other. For example, the worker’s use of particular skills 
and investment of activity and energy may well depend upon 
the worker’s perception of the clients motivation. In turn, in a 
manner of influence best described as reciprocal, the client’s 
motivation may increase or decrease as he or she senses the 
worker’s level of investment. (p. 3)
 In a similar fashion, Bourdieu argued that social scientists 
must keep in mind, first and foremost, that they are not research-
ing “things” but “relations” that are continually changing and 
up to interpretation (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu et al., 1993/2000, 
p. 609). Furthermore, Bourdieu argued that social scientists 
must employ “active and methodical listening” as opposed to 
“half-understanding” based on a “distracted and routinized 
attention” (p. 614). Bourdieu suggested that through these pro-
cesses, social scientists may “avoid the condescension and in-
sensitivity characteristic of other interview situations,” which 
does little more than offer a “projection of doxic belief” (Stabile 
& Morooka, 2003). Bourdieu believed that this practice of en-
gaged listening was effective in suspending, if not completely 
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transcending, commonly held beliefs (doxa) that serve to per-
petuate the symbolic violence experienced by social work cli-
ents (Stabile & Morooka, 2003). As such, Bourdieu believed that 
while relational analysis may at first seem subjective, when 
paired with reflexivity, it could in fact become a more effective 
means of arriving at truth. 
Addressing Inequality 
 In addition to highlighting the ways that social workers 
should examine themselves, their field, and their relationships 
with clients, Bourdieu’s theories also call for social workers 
to critically engage with the sociopolitical order shaping their 
clients’ reality, and to invest their cultural, social, and intellec-
tual capital to oppose inequalities. According to Fram (2004), 
Bourdieu’s formulation of habitus, which is defined in terms of 
an individual’s position within society, and the self-worth he 
derives from his position, requires that social workers consid-
er structural barriers and the effects of underclass status when 
considering the attitudes and behaviors of clients. Furthermore, 
due to the interrelationship of poverty, individual well-being, 
and behavior, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework also makes it 
clear that social work with clients must involve efforts to dimin-
ish the effects of poverty, both material and embodied, in order 
to achieve meaningful change. 
 Citing Bourdieu and Waquant’s (in Bourdieu et al., 
1993/2000) depiction of American ghettos, often characterized 
by an absence of police, schools, health care institutions, and 
social service organizations, Garret (2007a) argues that social 
workers must also resist the push of neoliberalism and the re-
treat of the state in providing a social safety net for the poor. As 
Pileggi and Patton (2003) maintain, when working in a neoliber-
al context, “practitioners of a field become liable to two masters: 
the practices and norms of [their] discipline and the practices 
and norms of the market” (p. 318). In line with this, social work-
ers must resist efforts to make social work more “managerial” 
and market-focused (Garrett, 2007a, 2007b), and to use social 
work as a means of controlling the poor (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu 
et al., 1993/2000). As such, Bourdieu’s theories encourage social 
workers to employ a multi-level approach, addressing not only 
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individual factors but also the effect of structural forces on cli-
ent circumstances. 
Unanswered Questions
 In Jeremy Lane’s (2000) text, Pierre Bourdieu: A Critical In-
troduction, the author makes a salient point that Bourdieu’s 
theories are elitist and deterministic, and that they insinu-
ate that oppressed individuals do not have the proper reflex-
ivity to liberate themselves.  To what degree then, is it possi-
ble that by adopting Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, social 
workers also introduce elitism and determinism into the habi-
tus of their clients?  If, as Bourdieu’s theories postulate, reflex-
ivity is exclusive to social scientists and sociologists, or barring 
that, those with the social and economic means to engage in 
such a practice, how do such claims feed into clients’ feelings of 
hopelessness, dependency, or the notion that they are “objects” 
of welfare? Furthermore, where is there room within Bourdieu’s 
theories for empowerment?  A theory that focuses solely on the 
distinction between “victims” and “perpetrators,” and which 
claims that a protest movement amongst the oppressed would 
be a “social miracle” (Bourdieu, 1998) does not hold much hope 
for self-liberation.   
 While some social workers engage in community and mac-
ro-level social work, most engage one-on-one with clients, within a 
limited span of time.  A number of authors (Emirbayer & Williams, 
2005; Emond, 2003; Horvat & Davis, 2011; Houston, 2002; Kita, 2011) 
have argued that Bourdieu’s theories can be used to inform social 
work with individuals.  However, Bourdieu’s theories largely ne-
gate the ability of individuals to change their habitus outside of 
structural change, or with any immediacy:  
 
… such transformations, as any number of sociological stud-
ies suggest, do not happen ‘spontaneously.’ They must be pre-
pared within the social formation over time, events building 
upon events and opening up spaces of opportunity. This is 
only possible, however, if the events of the present do not 
pass away into nothing but rather cumulate and sediment; if 
the actions of today have a durable impact upon the actions of 
tomorrow. (Crossley, 2001, p. 116)  
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 Within this context, are Bourdieu’s theories useful in help-
ing clients find meaningful change in their personal lives on a 
day-to-day basis without bringing change to the larger social 
context?  Also, if Bourdieu’s theories offer no place for liberation 
consciousness (Lane, 2000) or agency (Fram, 2004; Schinkel, 
2007), how can social workers engage with clients to solve in-
dividual-level problems? Especially considering the limitation 
of time, how do social workers help clients change their per-
sonal circumstances in the absence of structural change? Fur-
thermore, what does it mean for social workers to advocate for 
structural change? Must all social workers fight the “scourge of 
neoliberalism” or are smaller battles also meaningful? 
 Finally, as pointed out by Sayer (2010), Bourdieu’s theories 
do not leave room for social workers to engage with clients in 
terms of morality, responsibility, or concern for others. What 
does this mean for social workers that work with clients who 
have hurt others? Is there room within a Bourdieusian frame-
work to approach clients in terms of personal responsibili-
ty, restorative justice, and compassion for those who have been 
hurt? Within the context of strategic moves within fields, how 
do social workers assist clients in setting things right?
Ways Forward
 Bourdieu’s theories call equally upon critical intellectuals to 
address inequality at the deeply personal level, undermining the 
doxa that defines client’s habitus, while also using social capi-
tal to enact change at the mezzo and macro levels. The fact that 
Bourdieu and his colleagues (1993/2000) specifically identified 
social workers as not living up to this duty may indicate that the 
field has lost its way as the champion for the poor and oppressed. 
 As illustrated by Reisch and Andrews (2002), the field 
of social work has a long tradition of zealous progressivism 
spanning from the settlement houses in the early 20th centu-
ry, through the Rank and File Movement of the 1930s, and cul-
minating in the Radical Social Work Movement of the 1970s. 
These campaigns, headed primarily by social workers, were 
characterized not only by the direct help provided to clients, 
but also by their greater efforts toward equality, including labor 
activism, marches, boycotts, and strikes. In addition, The Rank 
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and File Movement and Radical Social Work Movement both 
challenged the professionalization of social work, believing 
that it undermined the relationship between social workers and 
clients. Instead, these movements encouraged closer relation-
ships between social workers and clients, based on common 
class interests (Ferguson, 2008). 
 Despite this tradition, Ferguson (2008) and others (Garrett 
2007a, 2007b; Waquant, 2010) argue that social work has become 
increasingly conservative, characterized by: 
… policies that insist that the primary role of social work-
ers is to ‘manage’ ‘high-risk’ families or individuals, to ration 
increasingly meager services, and to collude in the demoni-
zation of groups such as young people and asylum seekers. 
(Ferguson, 2008, p. 4)
 In his book, Reclaiming Social Work, Ferguson (2008) also 
makes the point that recent trends toward managerialism have 
left many social workers alienated, despondent, and estranged 
from the profession. If social work is to reclaim its identify as 
a compassionate profession, committed to and aligned with the 
interests of the underclass, it is necessary for it to return to its 
progressive roots and challenge the social structures that under-
mine social justice. According to Ferguson, this is a direction that 
is not only necessary for the well-being of social work clients, but 
also for social workers to be happy and fulfilled in their work.
 For some, however, a command toward structural activism 
may be overwhelming. Are all social workers responsible for 
macro-level social work? What about clients? How do they fit 
within this macro-level activity? Despite his rhetorical focus on 
neoliberalism in Acts of Resistance (1998/1998), Bourdieu’s writ-
ings also demonstrate that he saw the value of small battles 
oriented toward larger social goals. It one example, Bourdieu 
describes efforts by French welfare ministries to protect social 
housing policy:
For example, within the French bureaucracy, when housing 
finance was being reformed, the welfare ministries fought 
against the financial ministries to defend the social hous-
ing policy. Those civil servants had an interest in defending 
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their ministries and their positions; but they also believed in 
what they were doing, they were defending their convictions. 
(Bourdieu, 1998/1998, p. 33)
 In a similar way, social workers can engage in a number of 
everyday actions that are beneficial to the lives of their clients. 
Most importantly, social workers must use reflexivity to exam-
ine and resist the tendency within themselves and their offices 
to blame clients for their situations, focus on weakness, or exert 
domination and control. In addition, within the fields in which 
their clients live, social workers must use their expertise, train-
ing, and social capital to advocate for the provision of concrete 
resources necessary to the lives of their clients. To this end, social 
workers must push their agencies to be less punitive and stingy 
in allocating food, money and other assets to clients, and should 
work with clients to mobilize and access services within their 
community. Above that, social workers must fight efforts within 
their agencies to retract social services or to implement miserly 
means-testing procedures that humiliate and discourage:
‘The world is not a commodity!’ reflects the widespread feel-
ing amongst many social workers that their practice should 
be driven by values of respect and social justice, rather than 
budgetary considerations. (Ferguson, 2008, p. 4)
 Finally, social workers should use their trade unions (Service 
Employees International Union [SEIU], for example) and pro-
fessional organizations (National Association of Social Workers 
[NASW]) to continually advocate on behalf of social work clients. 
During the Occupy Wall Street Movement of 2011, both the SEIU 
and the NASW were galvanized in the national effort to protest 
cuts to essential social services among the poor and middle class. 
While inspiring at the time, efforts among conservatives to cur-
tail basic social services began before the Occupy Movement, 
and continued after. As such, social workers must push their 
representatives to remain vigilant and vocal on behalf of clients, 
even without a national movement to inspire them. At present, 
a number of nationally popular politicians are advocating for 
cuts to food stamps, Social Security, Medicaid, and other fun-
damental social safety net programs. On these issues and oth-
ers like them, clients depend on the social capital, support, and 
113Applying Bourdieu’s Theories to Social Work
activism of social workers to prevent retrenchment and maintain 
a basic standard of living for the poor. Social workers must use 
their unions and national organizations to lobby Congress and 
to speak within governmental institutions on behalf of the poor. 
To the extent that representatives of the social work community 
are not doing this, it is the responsibility of every social worker to 
spur their affiliations to these causes. 
 While Bourdieu’s theories may appear elitist, esoteric, or 
overly ambitious, they contain an explanatory framework with 
real world meaning for the field of social work. As argued by 
Lane (2000), Bourdieu’s most important theoretical contribution 
is the connection he built between structuralism and existential-
ism through the conceptual use of habitus. This is also Bourdieu’s 
most important contribution to social work. By illuminating the 
way that inequalities influence the self-perception (via symbolic 
violence), attitudes and behaviors of clients, Bourdieu signals to 
social workers that their work on behalf of clients must attend to 
inequality and structural barriers. In addition, as demonstrated 
by Peillon (1998), social workers must also be cognizant of their 
own habitus, using reflexivity to remain fair and earnest advo-
cates for their clients. By applying these salient principles, social 
workers can become more effective and meaningful in their prac-
tice, but also more connected, fulfilled, and relevant.
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